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Abstract
General Equilibrium Theory in econometrics is based on the vague
notion of utility. Prices, dynamics, and market equilibria are
supposed to be derived from utility. Utility is sometimes treated like a
potential, other times like a Lagrangian. Illegal assumptions of
integrability of actions and dynamics are usually made. Economists
usually assume that price is the gradient of utility in equilibrium, but I
observe instead that price as the gradient of utility is an integrability
condition for the Hamiltonian dynamics of an optimization problem.
I discuss both deterministic and statistical descriptions of the
dynamics of excess demand and observe that Adam SmithÕs
stabilizing hand is not to be found either in deterministic or stochastic
dynamical models of markets nor in the observed motions of asset
prices. Evidence for stability of prices of assets in free markets has
not been found.
20. Overview
Section 1 defines utility, marginal utility and ÔGeneral Equilibrium
TheoryÕ, which postulates price as the gradient of utility as an
equilibrium condition. Part 2 introduces the dynamics of GET, the
ABH model, and the search for stable equilibria, motion toward a
unique stable equilibrium point represents the universal action of
Adam SmithÕs hand. Scarf showed that it is easy to construct models
where stable equilibria do not occur, and Saari pointed out that
chaos is not excluded. I add the observation that excess demand
dynamics also does not exclude complexity. Adam SmithÕs hand
becomes unable to match demand and supply in unregulated free
markets. Part 3 discusses the Hamiltonian systems that arise from
the use of optimization and control theory in econometrics. Here, I
point out that the condition that price is a gradient of utility is an
integrability condition for the dynamics, not an equilibrium
condition, that the utility is generally a functional, not a function,
and that stable equilibria cannot occur. Part 4 follows the pioneer
Osborne in discussing markets and trading via a toy model of limit
orders, and follows Black in observing that noise is essential for
liquidity. Section 5 introduces OsborneÕs lognormal model of noisy
stock prices. The CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) is derived
from white noise, and in section 6 the Black-Scholes option pricing
model is derived from the CAPM. It is observed that the notion of
utility (along with Adam SmithÕs hand) is not used in modeling stock
prices and apparently can be forgotten. Section 7 explains why the
study of prices as deterministic flows in the ABH model and control
theory, even in the chaotic or complex case, cannot model noise
(ÔrandomnessÕ) in stock prices at short times.  In part 8 I note that
there is no idea of stability or equilibrium in the stochastic dynamics
used to model asset prices, and that neither the lognormal nor the
correct empirical distribution (exponential) defines an ÔequilibriumÕ
price. Here, Adam SmithÕs hand is observed to have disappeared
altogether because there are no restoring forces: excess demand is
pure random noise. The economists mislabel stochastic dynamics as
Ôequilibrium dynamicsÕ because they maximize expected utility
(which does not guarantee equilibrium) instead of maximizing
entropy (which would, if equilibrium were possible). Part 9 informs
the reader of OsborneÕs observation that the supply-demand
3ÔgraphsÕ in SamuelsonÕs text are merely cartoons that cannot be
derived from empirical data.
1. What is econometrics?
Econometrics begins with Adam SmithÕs idea of an Ôinvisible handÕ
that is supposed to match supply to demand in markets. An
equilibrium market is defined as one where the match of supply to
demand determines the price of a commodity. In such a market
trades are imagined to take place only at the equilibrium price. The
following mathematics, which I will call econo-logic, is invented as
the underpinning of General Equilibrium Theory (GET).
Given n commodities in quantities x1,....xn, a function U(x1,...xn),
called ÔsatisfactionÕ (economists also call it ÔutilityÕ) is postulated.
Utility should describe consumer preferences, but only for a ÔrationalÕ
consumer. A rational consumer is one who maximizes utility subject
to a budget constraint, completing the circle. The function U is
assumed to be concave, building in the assumption of decreasing
returns: less satisfaction from eating five ice-cream cones than from
eating one. Because utility functions cannot be derived without more
information one must consider the entire class of concave utility
functions. This classification is topologically well-defined only
locally, not globally, because it is not invariant under arbitrary
nonlinear coordinate transformations.
Equilibrium is described as the result of maximizing U subject to the
budget constraint [1]  
 M = px = constant    (1)
where x is the state vector in commodity space with entries xi and p is
a covector (Òco-state vectorÓ) whose ith entry is the price pi  of the i
th
commodity. I use here matrix notation
 
px = (p1...pn)
x1
xn
= p1x1 + ... + pnxn
   (1b)
but sometimes below will use Gibbs notation
4  
∇p•ε(p) =
∂εi
∂pi
Σ
i = 1
n
             (1c)
to denote inner products of covectors with vectors. Maximizing the
utility subject to the budget constraint(1)  yields
  pi = λ ∂U∂xi ,                  (2)
where l  is a Lagrange multiplier. The utility slopes along the various
Cartesian axes are called marginal utilities. According to
economists, we are in equilibrium whenever
  
marginal satisfaction of eating beans
price of N beans
=
marginal satisfaction of owning a BMW
price of a BMW
= ... = λ
(3)
An old assumption is to identify l  as the marginal utility of money.
ItÕs not clear that (3) correctly describes eating beans: eating five
beans is more satisfying than eating one bean (if you like beans),
although eating ten thousand beans at one sitting, compared with
eating ten beans, probably is not. This math-mythology also does not
describe stock market bubbles, where higher prices invite still higher
prices (increasing returns) until the crash. Maybe satisfaction is more
complex than is assumed within the confines of econo-logic (Neo-
Classical Economics), but let us not become mired in objections at this
point. There is enough time for analyzing the details as we proceed.
There is a long-standing internal inconsistency in GET: given a price
covector p(x) (price as a function of supply or demand x) the integral
 Ar = pdx
C             (4)
typically depends on the integration path C. Utility is defined by
integrating a nonintegrable differential form [2], so that utility is
more like 'heat', or a Lagrangian, than potential energy or free
5energy. Utility is a path-dependent functional, not a function, unless
an integrability requirement is satisfied by the differential form 
 pdx .
The integrability condition is generally not satisfied, but this has not
stopped econometricians from assuming utility functions in their
model-making. Samuelson [3] tried to argue the integrability
problem away by suggesting that if consumers would only behave in
a certain way then utility would be path-independent. This may
sound 'logical' within the confines of econo-logic. It would be like
trying to change the) empirical data to fit the theory rather than the
reverse, if empirical data had at all been used. The general problem
of nonintegrability has been faced at an elementary level, but was
never solved within econometrics. Typically, integrability has been
assumed at all levels in econometrics whenever it was convenient to
do so, including in dynamical generalizations of GET (see below).
Adam SmithÕs invisible hand did not act at all in the hypothetical
trading that occurs at equilibrium in GET. The hand did not bring
prices together because nothing was done to reach equilibrium. To
remedy this gap Walras suggested that we imagine that an auction
should occur in order to reach equilibrium. Adam SmithÕs invisible
hand is then a synonym for the bidding and price adjustments during
the bidding. Imagine many traders at a market, each with his own
initial commodity vector xo held with initial price covector po. An
auctioneer, called the Walras auctioneer, calls out a price vector p.
Each trader computes his excess demand
  ε1(p) = (p – po)x     (5)
 and adjusts his prices accordingly. Excess demand (supply) in a
particular commodity means that the price must increase (decrease)
before the next round of bidding. This continues until the total excess
demand for all traders vanishes, which defines equilibrium. Trades
are then allowed to occur. If this seems a tortured caricature of a real
auction (forcing reality to fit the model rather than the reverse), it is
a good example of econo-logic. Adam SmithÕs main idea in
capitalism, the notion of a trader making a profit (financial friction),
is completely eliminated from the price-adjustment process of GET.
Economists will reply: ÒYou misunderstand the idea of equilibrium
due to the balance of supply and demand. We only want to prove the
6existence of equilibriumÓ, where, by ÒproofÓ, they mean only
mathematically, not empirically. In statistical physics the
thermodynamic limit is generally impossible to prove mathematically
but thermal equilibrium is accurately observed in careful, controlled
experiments (as when experimenters measure the specific heat at
constant pressure to the fifth decimal place near a second order
transition).
In the trial and error (ÔTatonnementÕ) price-adjustment process
described above stability of equilibrium was assumed implicitly,
otherwise no equilibrium is reached during the auction. In order to
model Adam SmithÕs invisible hand, which must always move prices
toward a stable equilibrium point in classical and neo-classical
economics, we must invent a dynamical system and study stability.
Invention (as opposed to nature with unique Newtonian dynamics) is
not unique, so we will be led to consider topological classes of
dynamics by having to fall back on mathematical postulation rather
than Galilean empiricism. The difficulties facing anyone who might
want to try to discover the correct topological dynamics class for a
given market from statistics or time series analysis are discussed in
[5].
2. Arrow-Block-Hurwicz dynamics
In order to discuss stability of the predicted equilibria the
econometrician, with no Galileo-Kepler-Newton shoulders to stand
on, must first invent a dynamics model.
In ABH dynamics [6] one starts as above by postulating a scalar utility
function U whose gradient is assumed proportional to the price
covector for n commodities
  pi = λ ∂U∂xi .                 (5)
The commodities are represented by a vector x in commodity space,
where the entries defining x are the quantities of each commodity
held, supplied, or demanded, depending on the context. Commodity
space is implicitly taken to be flat, otherwise x is not a vector. One
then has two separate spaces, price space and commodity space, and
7these are not yet thought of as a phase space in GET. Given price as
a function of demand (or supply) x, one must then be able to invert
the relationship (5) to find demand as a function of price, x = d(p).
Given that one holds n commodities at time t, the usually assumed
budget constraint [1,7] (Walras' 'law') says that the sums of prices
times numbers of commodities held at time 0 must be the same as the
prices times quantities of commodities held at any later time t. That
is, the scalar product (in our inner product commodity space)
  M = px             (6)
will automatically be conserved when we get around to building the
dynamics. The excess demand e 1(p) is then formed in commodity
space for one consumer, then ith consumer,
  εi(p) = px – pxo ,           (7)
where xo represents the quantities of each commodity initially held
before the ÔWalras auctionÕ begins. Having constructed the excess
demand for n commodities for one consumer one then uses
permutation symmetry to write down the total excess demand vector
for each commodity for m consumers. This yields the total excess
demand vector e(p). The ABH model simply assumes that the price
changes obey
dp/dt = e (p),                (8)
so that WalrusÕ auction has been replaced by a flow in p-space.
Equilibrium is described as vanishing excess demand, and the process
is still called Tatonnement.
That a flow should be called Ôtrial and errorÕ appears peculiar at first
sight, because what could be further from the notion of an auction
than a flow? However, if we construct solutions to (8) using PicardÕs
method of repeated approximations then we have a trial and error
approach to the exact solution that is guaranteed to converge
whenever a Lipshitz condition is satisfied by the excess demand. The
solution, however, neednÕt be an equilibrium solution and generally
8isnÕt, even as the time goes to infinity (this is a not only a question of
existence and stability of equilibria, but of basins of attraction).
The Walras condition (the budget constraint M = constant)) means
that that the vectors p and e (p) are perpendicular. This constraint
confines the motion to an n-sphere in price space. General
Equilibrium Theory then tries to restrict the studies to excess
demands that have a unique equilibrium, and mainly searches for
those equilibria, which is rather boring mathematics with trivial,
uninteresting (not to mention inapplicable) dynamics. The search for
a globally-unique equilibrium was a way to try to justify the
universality of Adam SmithÕs invisible hand, the notion that, given a
free market, the same conditions should lead to equilibrium in
Moscow, Mexico City, New York, London, and Frankfort. In this
mythology, trading only occurs at equilibrium. However, asking for
universality of solutions of dynamics equations for arbitrary initial
conditions is too high an expectation. Even if the ABH model were
qualitatively applicable Moscow and New York could well belong to
different basins of attraction (nonuniversality of effects of excess
demand), and equilibria need not hold in market.
With only two commodities integrability is guaranteed by elementary
calculus. Integrable dynamics models with three commodities are
discussed in the readable paper by Scarf [7]. Integrable models with
three commodities have the nice property that the excess demand
vector must be the cross product in price space of the gradients of
two global functionally-independent conservation laws G1 and G2
[8],
  ε1(p) = µ∇G1x∇G2 ,         (9)
where m  is JacobiÕs multiplier. Scarf then shows that it is easy to
construct model utilities where there is no approach to equilibrium by
giving several nice examples, one of which has an unstable focus
surrounded by a stable limit cycle [1].
An approach to equilibrium requires a driven dissipative system,
which requires that the divergence of the excess demand vector in
price space cannot vanish identically,
9  ∇•ε(p) ≠ 0 .            (10)
Smale's [9] 'global Newton method' of locating equilibria, if
equilibria exist, implicitly uses the n-1 time-independent
conservation laws Gi of driven dissipative systems. The existence of
n-1 local conservation laws for driven dissipative systems
(integrable or not) was brought out in the open by Palmore [10], who
was the first to emphasize that the damped simple harmonic
oscillator has a global conservation law and actually constructed the
invariant. Many of todayÕs physicists and mathematicians seem to
have trouble accepting this fact, but it was known to Jacobi and Lie
quite generally. In a driven dissipative system these conservation
laws are singular at equilibria (Arnol'd [11] therefore refuses to label
them as Ôfirst integralsÕ, but they are conserved whether so-labeled
by Arnol'd or not).
In a nonintegrable system the conservation laws exist only locally
[5,8,11] so that the interactions can be transformed away only locally
(the flow can be parallelized only locally), never globally. There are
mathematical (but not economically realistic) conditions under which
stable equilibria occur and are unique [1,6], but Scarf shows that it is
easy to construct counter-examples where, e.g., an unstable
equilibrium is enclosed by a stable limit cycle. Saari [12] points out
that the class of more generally admissible excess demand vectors is
so great that nothing, especially not deterministic chaos, is
precluded. In other words, Adam SmithÕs invisible hand cannot be
relied upon to match supply to demand globally. At best, it is a local
phenomenon if it occurs at all in this theory. We now also know that
flows in phase space may not be merely chaotic, they may be complex
(no scaling laws, computer-like behavior, surprises at all length
scales [5,13]). In other words, the invisible hand does not guarantee
that equilbrium is stable, or even exists for an arbitrary excess
demand in the allowed topological class, and there is no reason at all
to believe in the universality of the effects excess demand on the basis
of GET. As with all dynamics problems, the important effects are all
local, not global. On the basis of econometric analysis, what works in
New York need not work in Tokyo, Frankfort, Paris, or Zurich. Some
leading dynamical systems theorists have hoped that econometrics
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would be useful [14], and some have gone over to econometrics [1,15],
but GET has never proven to be empirically useful.
Leaving aside the failure of the invisible hand to regulate the entire
world in a trivial way, there are other more serious objections to the
ABH model. First, what is the relaxation time for prices? This is a
very good question, because theoretical econometricians usually
assume rapid relaxation to equilibrium. This seems strange to
physicists, but we must remember that econometrics, especially GET,
is more like a belief-system or logic-system than it is like physics.
Unfortunately for physicists who might want try to do better, the left
hand side of the ABH equation (8) has units of $/sec or DM/sec,
whereas the right hand side (excess demand) is a pure number, and
there is no way to discover a fundamental constant (a global
invariant) with dimensions of money/time to repair this defect.
Relaxation times simply cannot be predicted on the basis of the ABH
model as it now stands. One could multiply e (p) by an interest rate to
get the right units, but this would be arbitrary and meaningless. Or,
one could abandon the idea that p represents price (has dimensions
of money), but where would that get us?
Lying in the same boat is the question of the relaxation time of the
commodity variables x. In the ABH model the prices are slaved to the
commodity variables, which are implicitly presumed to relax
infinitely fast: there are no differential equations
 dx/dt = s(p,x)     (11)
for the commodity variables. A physicist might ignore the Walras law
(the budget constraint), because physicists are usually pretty good at
violating budgets anyway. LetÕs do this and look at a vaguely
analogous mathematics problem in physics, a Hamiltonian system
where x is position (phase space can always chosen to be flat [8]) and
the covector p is the corresponding canonical momentum. If
  p = ∇U                (12)
where U is a scalar function of x, then  the dynamics is globally
integrable [8] and the motion is confined to an n-dimensional cylinder
or torus in the 2n-dimensional (x,p) phase space. Einstein pointed out
11
that assuming that p = grad U is equivalent to assuming integrability
of the dynamical system [16], although this was shown earlier in
LiouvilleÕs more complete explanation of integrability [8b]. This is a
formal non-economic analog of WalrasÕ law. Here, there is no
dissipation, and so there are no stable equilibria in phase space, only
elliptic and hyperbolic points. For bounded motion one has eternal
oscillation (with neutral stability). The function U is just the reduced
action in this case. The condition for (12) (discussed explicitly by
Liouville but not by Einstein) is that there are n global commuting
constants of the motion, n global conservation laws of the
Hamiltonian system. This then guarantees that Ldt is an exact
differential, where L is the Lagrangian, so that the action is now a
function (a generating function). The canonical momentum then is
the x-gradient of the action or the reduced action.
If, on the other hand, the dynamics is nonintegrable (as is typically
the case) then the reduced action
 Ar = p
C
dx
            (13)
 is a path-dependent functional, not a function, so that the analog of
the utility U exists at best locally, not globally, and cannot even be
written down as an infinite series without using analytic
continuation. This might seem very far fetched as economics, but
Hamiltonian systems actually occur in econometrics (see section 3
below).
Hamiltonian dynamics shows that it is dangerous blindly to assume
that the question of path dependence of a utility functional (13) can be
divorced from the question of integrability of the underlying
dynamics. Gibbs tried but failed to make a similar point to I. Fisher
[2], who was not as strong a mathematician as was Gibbs and didnÕt
understand integrability. Gibbs pointed out that the utility is
generally path dependent, and suggested that Fisher address the
problem of nonintegrability in relation to a possible underlying
dynamics. Fisher did not understand nonintegrability of differential
forms (neither did Walras or Pareto), so that GibbsÕ point was
entirely lost on Fisher, who erased all mention of nonintegrability
from his last papers on utility after he had become established as an
12
economist. I expect that Gibbs knew and understood LiouvilleÕs
integrability theorem in Hamiltonian mechanics and had in mind
precisely the discussion above. FisherÕs failure to address the path
dependence of utility left Samuelson and other economists to worry
about nonintegrability some fifty years later. The economists finally
stopped worrying about it, but never solved the problem. It is not
clear that they became aware of LiouvilleÕs integrability theorem,
connecting the existence of a utility function to integrability of the
dynamical system, during the heyday of deterministic chaos.
3. Optimization via control
The Hamiltonian approach in econometrics allows us partly to
repair two flaws in the ABH model in a simple way: a time scale can
be introduced into the dynamics problem, and equations of motion
for demand/supply ( or ÒproductionÓ) variables x can be introduced.
Hamiltonian systems fall out of optimization problems in control
theory [17] because every variational principle formally yields a
Hamiltonian system [18]. In econometrics the Hamiltonians that
occur are not of the form studied by physicists, but many general
theorems on Hamiltonian mechanics (like LiouvilleÕs integrability
theorem) apply independently of the form of the Hamiltonian.
We  begin with the ÔdiscountedÕ utility functional (the price of money
is discounted at the rate e-bt)
 A = e–btu(x,v,t)dt
           (14)
where u(x,v,t) is the undiscounted Ôutility rateÕ and v is a set of
control variables or control functions (ÒinstrumentsÓ). Optimize
utility with respect to the Ôset of instrumentsÕ v, but subject to the
constraint
 x = s(x,v,t)                (15)  
where s is the production function (this is MayerÕs problem in the
calculus of variations [19]). The system (15) may be driven-dissipative
in commodity space with the variables v held constant ((15) could be
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a damped linear oscillator or a Lorenz model, e.g.). Optimization
yields
  δA = dt(δ(e–btu) + pδ(s(x.v.t) – x) = 0
   (16)
where the pi are the Lagrange multipliers.  The extremum conditions
are
 H(x,v,p) = maxv(u(x,v,t) + ps(x,v,t)) ,        (17)
  ∂u
∂vi
+ pk
∂sk
∂vi
= 0
,                       (17b)
(sum over repeated index k) which yields Ôthe positive feedback formÕ
 v = f(x,p,t) .            (18)
Substituting (18) into (17) yields.
  H(x,p) = maxv(u(x,v,t) + ps(x,v,t))
p = bp – ∇xH
x = ∇pH = S(x.p.t)         (19)
where, with v = f(x,p,t) determining the maximum in (17),            
S(x,p,t) = s(x,f(x,p,t),t). The integral A in (14) is just the Action (the
discounted utility rate is the Lagrangian).
It is easy to prove (19) by using by using the chain rule. To show that
we actually have a Hamiltonian system, use the discounted utility
rate w(x,v,t) = e-bt u(x,v,t) to find
14
  h(x,p) = maxv(w(x,v,t) + ps(x,v,t))
pi = – ∂h∂xi
xi =
∂h
∂pi = Si(x.p.t) ,      (20)
which is a Hamiltonian system. Whether or not (15) with constant vÕs
is driven-dissipative this system is phase-volume preserving, is
conservative (and h is generally time dependent).
In (19) we have a time scale determined by the discount rate b,
  p = bp – ∇xH ,             (21)
although Hamiltonian term in the excess demand still has no clearly
defined units, so this is not a complete fix. This dynamical system
generally does not obey WalrasÕ budget constraint. The Lagrange
multipliers/canonical momenta pi are called Ôshadow pricesÕ for the
production or investment process. If we think momentarily of pi as
ÔmoneyÕ and b as an interest rate, then bpi contributes to the total
excess demand for money (negative interest b < 0 is possible, and
was issued in special cases by the Bank of Japan during 1999). The
entire right hand side of (21) must be thought of as excess demand
e i(p) for commodity xi.
In this formulation the discounted utility rate w(x,v,t) = e-bt u(x,v,t) is
the Lagrangian. Since the Hamiltonian h depends on time it isnÕt
conserved, but integrability occurs if there are n global commuting
conservation laws. These conservation laws typically do not
commute with the Hamiltonian h(x,p), and are generally time-
dependent [8,8b]. The integrabilty condition (due to n commuting
global conservation laws) can be written as
  p = ∇U(x)    (12)
where for bounded motion the utility U(x) is multivalued (turning
points of the motion in phase space make U multivalued). U is just
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the reduced action given by(13), which is a path-independent
functional when integrability (12) is satisfied (so is the action A given
by(14)). When satisfied, the integrability condition eliminates chaotic
motion (and complexity) from consideration because there is then a
global, differentiable canonical transformation to a coordinate
system where the motion is free particle motion (n commuting
constant speed translations on a flat manifold imbedded in the 2n
dimensional phase space). Conservation laws correspond, as usual,
to continuous symmetries of the dynamical system (20).
Note that if integrability holds so that U = Ar then p is not merely
Ôshadow priceÕ but is, according to the economists, simply ÔpriceÕ.
There is no difference between calculating p as the gradient of A or Ar
in the integrable case. Either way, one gets the same price covector p.
However, the corresponding p is not an ÔequilibriumÕ price covector
because (12) is not an equilibrium condition, in spite of the fact that
the utility rate w(x,v,t) is maximized with respect to the instruments
v while maintaining the production rate constraint.
The equilibria that fall out of control problems in the 2n dimensional
phase space of the Hamiltonian system (20) cannot be attracting (are
not stable). By LiouvilleÕs theorem (which is all thatÕs needed to
prove PoincareÕs recurrence theorem whenever the motion is
bounded) equilibria are either elliptic or hyperbolic points (sources
and sinks in phase space are impossible in a Hamiltonian system).
Bounded motion guarantees that there is eternal oscillation (stable
or unstable), with no approach to equilibrium, because either the
motion is neutrally stable with elliptic points as equilibria, or all
equilibrium points are unstable (hyperbolic) and the motion may be
chaotic or complex (no example of the latter has been constructed but
Moore [13] has suggested that it may occur for n = 3, whereas chaos
requires only n = 2). For unbounded motion there must be at least one
hyperbolic point. Integrable motion that is not oscillatory must be
unbounded (see [20] for examples in econometrics). Econometricians
still call hyperbolic points ÒstableÓ [20], by which they mean: choose
initial conditions on the stable asymptote. To do this, Adam SmithÕs
hand is presumed to be infinitely precise and certainly cannot be
subject to any noise.
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If we have an integrable system (20) and use (12) to find demand as a
function of price, x =d(p,t), then we can substitute back into the right
hand side of the price equation in (20) to obtain
  p = ε(p,t)              (8b)
which is not a volume-preserving flow in the in the n+1 dimensional
price-time subspace of phase space because
  
∇p•ε(p,t) =
∂εi
∂pi
Σ
i = 1
n
= – Σ
i = 1
n ∂2h
∂xi∂pi
≠ 0
 .   (8c)
In other words we end up with a special case of non-phase volume
preserving ABH dynamics. ItÕs instructive for a physicist to solve the
simple harmonic oscillator by this method: the equilibria that are
defined by setting  the right hand side of (8b) equal to zero are not
oscillator equilibria in the full phase space, but only represent that
the oscillator passes through the equilibrium position with either
positive or negative finite momentum ((12) is not an equilibrium
condition).
Should central bankers and economic planners have faith in
econometric models that are based on controlling a finite number of
instruments vi? No, because models with chaotic or even complex
motions cannot be ruled out of consideration. All of the models have
hyperbolic points as equilibria [20], which asks too much of Adam
SmithÕs hand.
In formal welfare economics one assumes additive utilities: one
satisfaction function per ÒagentÓ. An ÒagentÓ may be a consumer, the
Fed, a factory, or a welfare recipient, depending on the context.
Pareto efficiency is defined by maximizing the utility of one agent
while holding the utilities of the other n-1 agents constant. A Pareto
efficient allocation is purported to describe the best welfare
distribution: each agent/recipient is supposed to be as well off as
possible, given the utilities of other recipients. Pareto efficiency is an
illusion, because utility functions donÕt exist in the absence of
integrable dynamics. Gibbs was right, Fisher, Walras, and Pareto
17
were wrong: one shouldnÕt assume a utility function without first
defining the dynamics and then proving integrability.
18
4. A toy model of the stock market
Trading of commodities is postulated to occur in GET only at
equilibrium where supply exactly matches demand, just like the
cartoons (ÕgraphsÕ) in SamuelsonÕs text [4] (the ÔgraphsÕ in that text
generally do not follow from real data or real theories but are mainly
sketches based on the unverified speculations of GET). At equilibrium
agents hypothetically buy/sell reversibly, without any loss, in
analogy with the reversible transformation of ice into water at zero
degrees centigrade, or like the reversible transfer of random kinetic
energy into work in a Carnot engine. Approximately reversible
water-ice transformations are possible in carefully controlled
experiments, but low financial-friction trading is usually possible
only in very liquid markets over the tiniest time intervals, at best.
Markets in Europe are generally irreversible (sales are generally
final). Karstadt will not likely refund your money later in the
afternoon after a morning purchase just because your wife doesnÕt
like the color of the shirt you bought. Some markets in the US are
reversible: if you buy a pair of Jeans at K Mart or DillardÕs you can
usually reverse the trade perfectly on a time scale of a few days.
Most markets are not liquid enough to permit approximately
reversible trading (low-friction trading), and whenever they are
liquid the friction usually cannot be ignored. You cannot immediately
resell a new car to the dealer after signing the contract and get your
money back. He will make a second profit from you, otherwise no
trade will take place. The less liquid the market, the bigger the spread
(cars, housing). Bond traders and specialists in stocks maintain
bid/ask prices that represent small but non-negligible Ôfinancial
frictionÕ. Discount brokerages offer low-friction trades in a liquid
market. Liquidity seems to require finite and small but non-negligible
friction. A trade likely will not be reversed if the seller would lose a
big profit via the reversal.
Black [22] emphasized that noise is essential for liquidity. Noise and
friction go together. Small friction (low transaction fees) is necessary
for a liquid market. Finite friction limits noise at the highest
frequencies (shortest time intervals) by placing a lower limit on price
changes that can speculated over with any hope of profit. An
enlightening toy model of the market, where prices change
discretely, is discussed by Osborne [22] who constructs realistic
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examples of discrete supply and demand functions of price for
traders placing limit orders in the stock market. Here, we find an
example of econometrics as a good physicist would practice it.
We can illustrate the working of a stock market via the following
model. Market orders are always executed, so we ignore them in
favor of limit orders, which require that a specialist (dealer) matches
supply to demand (market orders might come closer to the
economistsÕ desire to observe equilibrium than do limit orders). A
stock specialist (market maker) tries to maintain a definite supply of
one particular stock S, and a definite supply of cash. Both inventories
are large enough to take care of ÔnormalÕ trading with a specified
spread in bid/ask prices. How the specialist makes his profit is
described by Osborne (the dealerÕs not supposed to help to drive
prices up or down, but is supposed to try to maintain a smooth
market). Very liquid markets (heavily-traded stocks and bonds) have
low financial friction whereas the transaction costs for housing (real
estate broker) are high in a relatively viscous market.
Three prices should normally be shown on your discount brokerÕs
web site in real time: the last sale price, a bid price and an ask price.
Assume for simplicity that trades are only made in round lots (100
shares). Suppose that a sell order for 200 shares of S is executed at
the bid price of 20 1/8, which we can take to be 1/8 of a dollar lower
than the ask price (typical bid/ask spreads may be 1/16 or 1/8 of a
dollar on the NYSE, depending on liquidity of the stock S). The next
bid and ask quotes will be lowered to 20 and 19 7/8. Correspondingly,
if the last limit order executed was a buy of one or more round lots,
then the bid/ask quotes are both increased by 1/8. If no one wants to
buy at 20 and there is a mass of buy orders at 10, then either the
bid/ask prices must be dropped dramatically or else trading in the
stock must be halted for the day (like closure of a bank when thereÕs a
threat of a run). The stock market is not in equilibrium: the bid/ask
and trading prices are not equilibrium prices. Even when one limit
order can be filled (by matching a buyer at 20 1/8 to a seller at 20,
e.g.), most limit orders cannot be filled: the total excess demand for
the stock S does not vanish. Economists label stock market trading as
ÔequilibriumÕ because they tend to label everything as ÔequilibriumÕ,
even when it is not. I discuss this in detail in part 8 below.
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What about  the Ôreal valueÕ of an asset like a stock? Black argues that
ÔvalueÕ is both random  and unobservable, whereas price is random
and observable. He asserts that price always tends to return to value
after large deviations, but we will see in the next section that the
model used by Black and others to describe stock market movements
has no restoring forces, only random walkers. Black also says that he
will call the market ÔefficientÕ if price is within a factor of two of
value. Since value is both unobservable and undefined, this assertion
has no meaning. If we try to identify ÔvalueÕ with price then we may
fall into the trap of accepting the efficient market hypothesis (EMH),
which states that dart-throwing in designing a portfolio as is
effective trying to choose stocks on the basis of some other rational
basis, like an estimate of ÔvalueÕ. There is evidence that dart-
throwing can be beaten over short enough time intervals that
information has not had time to propagate to all investors (see
[24,24b], for example). Not all investors react the same at the same
time to the same information, and investors (agents) typically are not
rational but act on ÔhunchesÕ, on the basis of someone elseÕs advice,
or (as Black points out) on the basis of noise perceived as
information. Black observes that we never can be certain that we
have information instead of noise. He used the (now-popular) term
Ônoise traderÕ and argued that Ôinformation tradersÕ can make money
by timing their trades to take advantage of noise traders, who make
up the bulk of the market and are responsible for the liquidity of the
market. The EMH is a good assumption for people who do not
follow news closely and who react too slowly to anticipate changes
in market conditions. The EMH advises them to invest in index funds
and advises them not to follow the advice of Ôfinancial advisorsÕ,
who generally do not know any more about predicting market
advances or declines in a stock or the entire market than does a dart
thrower. In the end, the value of an asset like a stock or bond that
you canÕt eat, sleep in or under, warm or cool yourself with it, ride on
it, or use in any other desired way without liquidating it is worth, at
any given time t, exactly what the highest bid in the market says itÕs
worth at that time. ItÕs price at any later time is unknown and
undetermined. This does not prevent good traders from making
money. We can forget about the illusions of ÔvalueÕ and ÔequilibriumÕ
and concentrate on prices in the face of excess demand when it comes
to stocks, bonds, and money.
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For models of liquidity traps where demand canÕt be matched to
supply although agents have money to spend and want to make
trades, see Ackerlof [25] and Krugman [26].
All other things being equal, consumers prefer falling prices, or at
worst equilibrium, in a market whenever they have to buy items for
consumption or real use. People who buy stocks or offer credit prefer
rising prices of assets. No one who invests in the stock market wants
equilibrium (vanishing excess demand for the asset), because in that
case there are no gains (due to dividends or price appreciation). A
booming stock market is very far from equilibrium: the average
excess demand is positive and large, otherwise prices canÕt increase.
The US stock market from April-October, 1999, is roughly
approximated by equilibrium (index funds like vfinx (Vanguard 500)
have approximately no net gain/loss). During that time many
individual stocks have taken big falls (cpq, one, tyc, ...)  whole others
have skyrocketed (rhat, ge, ...). The fluctuations (ÔvolatilityÕ) have
been large for many individual stocks. Most individual stocks are not
in equilibrium even when the market approximately is. Long-time
expectations of typical investors for the stock market are of
nonequilibrium (big gains), not equilibrium. No one would invest for
the long haul in a stock market that is expected to be in equilibrium.
Prices cannot rise unless the bidders dominate the askers, which is
very good for the askers.
The stock market is generally not in equilibrium. Supply does not
match demand because all limit orders cannot be filled. There is no
Ôclearing priceÕ for one day, only a range of bid/ask prices over which
trades were made with nonzero total excess demand during the
entire day. The notion of equilibrium is not very useful and is even
misleading in modeling financial data dynamically. I will oppose the
tradition of the economists to call the stock market an example of
equilibrium. Following the example set by Black  [22], if they do not
accept my argument and revise their description then I will attribute
it to noise.
For an econometricianÕs approach to stock market pricing see
OÕHara [26b], where Osborne is not mentioned but utility is. For
other recent attempts to model markets, particularly limit orders, see
[26c,d]. For a more recent discussion of noise traders see [26e].
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5. Noise and stochastic models of price changes
Deterministic models have not proven useful for describing stock,
bond, and money market price motions. Evidence for deterministic
chaos was not found in market data [27]. One can relax budget
constraints to allow creation and annihilation of money, which is
realistic. Money is not conserved. It is created and destroyed via
credit, bond sales and recalls, defaults, etc. Money is created and
destroyed with the tap of a computer key. A model that a statistical
physicist may want to try to improve on is called the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM). CAPM is based upon the Ôlaw of one priceÕ
[28] (meaning that arbitrage possibilities over short time intervals
are unrealistically neglected) but uses random noise to represent the
fact that we cannot know what the future price of each of n assets Si
will, even after short time intervals.
Let p  be the price of asset S at time t and let r be the rate at which the
asset changes systematically in price, if there is a systematic change
in price. Money-asset markets are modeled by an excess demand of
the form
  dp
dt = ε(p) = r(t)p + η(t)             (22)
where r(t) is the drift rate for p and h  includes everything else that
contributes to the excess demand. The right hand side of (22) is the
total excess demand for the asset. The net excess demand for S,                
e (p) = rp + h , must be expected to be positive in order to attract
investors since most people do not willingly throw away money. If r
is constant and h  = 0 , then we have exponential growth of wealth of
the asset compounded at interest rate r (nonequilibrium), as in a
savings account or treasury bill over a period when interest rates
donÕt change. Interest and credit represent excess demand for money
(in Japan, in 1999, there is excess supply because people tend to save
rather than consume). When r is deterministic then we have an
example of a so-called Ôrisk-free assetÕ like a T-bill (this is a
definition, not a description). If we try to apply this picture to risky
assets like bonds or stocks (historically mislabeled ÔsecuritiesÕ) then r
is not constant and is not determined in advance, then we may treat
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it as noisy so that (22) is a Langevin equation where both r and h
represent noise. We canÕt calculate the future price p(t) of the asset
because we donÕt know what r(t) and h (t) will look like over the
investment period [0,D t].
The earliest model of stock prices by Bachelier [29] sets r = 0 and takes
h  to be Gaussian random noise (this is a model of an equilibrium
market because there is no expected price change D p). A Gaussian
distribution of h  does not fit stock price changes. Osborne [29] created
a revolution in finance by pointing out that one should instead study
the variable x(t, D t) = log(p(t + D t)/p(t)) = log(1 +D p/p), where x is
Gaussian random noise with mean square fluctuation s 2.D t. Osborne
found that stock prices could be fit approximately by this assumption
with s  (for a given stock) constant, which would mean that stock
prices are lognormally distributed. (Mandelbrot later found that
cotton prices have a Levy distribution at large prices and argued that
s  is formally infinite). Osborne [29] argued that one should study logp
on the basis of FechnerÕs law. Duck [31] argued that we need an
additive variable, and x(t, D t) is additive, in order to apply the
central limit theorem. I note also that one needs an additive variable
on the left hand side of a Langevin equation because we take random
noise to be additive (stochastic integration). The finance theorists
then study the Langevin equation
  dp(t) =p(t)r(t)dt +p(t)η(t)dt        (23)
where h  is Gaussian random noise. From here on I will use the
preferred language of finance and will use DoobÕs form [31f] of the
Langevin equation
  ∆pi = piri(t)∆t + pi σ∆B(t)       (24)
instead of the equation (23), because Ôstochastic calculusÕ [31f] based
on the Ito lemma [29b,c] allows one to derive Smoluchowski
equations not only for p but also for functions w(p,t) of p, which leads
to option pricing:  w(p,t) may the price of an option to buy the asset
S. D p/p is the fractional change in price over a small but finite time
interval D t. Also, we can take w = logp to get the Langevin equation
for logp
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  ∆log(pi(t + ∆t)/pi(t)) = pi(t)(ri(t) – σ2/2)∆t + pi(t) σ∆B(t) .  (24b)
In (24) ri is Gaussian random noise with expectation Ri and variance
s i
2, while D B is Gaussian random noise with mean equal to zero and
mean square fluctuation given by
  ∆B(∆t)2 = ∆t .               (24c)
In other words, both p and x are assumed to do a random walk,
including with respect to expectations about gain about some
average expected return R (we can also replace (24c) by a Levy flight
assumption to discuss fractional Brownian motion).
The beginning of the investment period for the portfolio of n assets
(S1,...Sn) is t, and the time horizon is D t. The CAPM model calculates
the total expected return R for the short investment period D t, the
sum of the fractional the price changes
  
Ri =
∆pi
pi = ri(t) ∆t ,           (25)
where the average is taken with probability density                    
P(r,D B) = P(r)P(D B), and where and P(r) and P( DB)  both describe
uncorrelated Gaussian random noise. Economists refer to ÔforcesÕ
that cause prices to return to ÔvalueÕ after large fluctuations but
ÔvalueÕ is both undefined and unobservable, and there are no
Ôrestoring forcesÕ in this drunken sailor model (24) of stock prices. If
the random walker happens to hit or come near any particular price
a few times, at random time intervals, then that is just an accident
that will likely happen Ôif we wait long enoughÕ for a statistically
meaningful expectation value to be realized. However, no force, and
certainly not Adam SmithÕs hand, has acted during the random walk,
where we must think of the entire right hand side of (24) as excess
demand. Excess demand is treated as random noise. If Ri is the
return on asset Si, then the return at time t on the portfolio of n + 1
assets will be
 
  
r(t) = xiri(t)Σi = 0
n
          (26)
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where So is a risk-free asset (ro = Ro is deterministic) and the other n
assets are risky (the Ri(t) are Gaussian random variables for                   
i = 1,2,...,n). Next, one writes
  
x0 = 1 – xiΣi = 1
n
           (27)
to obtain the (randomly fluctuating) portfolio return as
  
r(t) = R0 + xi(ri(t) – R0)Σi = 0
n
 .        (28)
If we form the mean square fluctuation of (r(t) - Ro) and minimize it
subject to the budget constraint
  
1 = xiΣi = 0
n
            (29)
and the constraint that the expected return at time t
  
R(t) = xiRi(t)Σi = 0
n
            (30)
is fixed, then we arrive at the prediction (31) of the CAPM also and
the definition of b . The portfolio is called Ômean-variance-efficientÕ.
Given the expected return (31), minimizing the mean square
fluctuation in the portfolio return is seen as minimizing the risk
because the variance is here identified as the ÔriskÕ [28]. Utility
maximization is forgotten in favor of risk minimization.
Suppose there is a mutual fund that is known to be efficient in this
sense. Each of the n assets in this portfolio is risky. The expected
return of asset Sa in the portfolio is
  Ra = Ro + β a(Re – Ro)         (31)
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where b a= s ae/s ee, s ee is the variance of the efficient portfolio and s ae
is the covariance of the risky asset with the efficient portfolio (which
we may take to be the market itself, or an index fund). To try to
understand the Fed ChairmanÕs speeches, which can have a big
effect on liquid asset markets during a speculative bubble, it helps to
know what the phrase Ôrisk premiumÕ means. The Ôrisk premiumÕ is
simply the second term on the right hand side of (31) [28].
It has long been known that the prediction (31) of CAPM does not
agree with the data. The NYSE data show better returns for low-
beta stocks than for high ones from the investment period 4/57-12/65
[33,34], which is the reverse of the modelÕs prediction (higher returns
for higher risk). This model is based on  EMH, namely, that all assets
do a random walk so that dart-throwing is predicted to be as good as
any other method when it comes to choosing a portfolio of stocks.
Another way to say it is that the Brownian motion approximation
ignores short time intervals over which new information can cause
price changes and during which arbitrage is possible. As Black points
out, however, we can never be sure that the perceived information is
not really just noise.
The biggest fault with the model is that the variances, as Mandelbrot
showed (see also Malkiel for later references [34]), are not well-
defined but show sudden sharp changes when computed over
increasingly longer time horizons. In applying the model one can not
use a long time series to obtain a ÔglobalÕ, estimate for the variance.
One should instead estimate the variance locally for the period D t
over which the investment is made. The variance estimates must be
continually revised as time goes on. In the worst case one must
expect ÔsurprisesÕ (like the collapse of prices of Compaq, Tyco,
Raytheon, Bank One, or any number of other observed large price
drops during spring-fall, 1999) that are not be included in the CAPM
estimate of risk (large deviations are ignored in the lognormal
model). These ÔsurprisesÕ are the real nature of complexity, and by
their very nature [13] cannot be predicted by any model of the market.
The stochastic equation (24) is not a complete dynamical model: it
fails to predict R. For a thought-provoking discussion of the
complexity of trying to understand how to try to model a prediction
of R somewhat realistically, see [34b].
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No model explains why market expectations R are so sensitive to
small interest rate changes. Malkiel [34] produces a back of the
envelope calculation that shows that this could be understood if
dividends (instead of price increases) were the main thing causing
agents to buy assets, but in a speculative bubble (like the US stock
market from 1994-1999, e.g.) dividend expectations are surely
negligible in comparison with expectations of capital appreciation
due to rising prices.
In the CAPM we have obtained an incomplete prediction without
having used utility. According to Varian [1] the CAPM can only be
made consistent with the economtricianÕs notion of expected utility
in two restricted cases. Given a probability measure/distribution
m (x), we define the expected utility as
  U = U(x)dµ(x)
.      (32)
An example of a probability measure is the empirical measure
defined by the data [29d]. Varian shows that optimization of
expected utility will not reduce to the CAPM unless (I) the utility is
quadratic, or else (II) all n assets are themselves normally-
distributed. However, Merton has derived the entire picture from
utility theory [30]. The main point is that we do not need utility to
arrive at the CAPM, nor do we need utility to derive the Black-
Scholes model. The expected utility functional is used in stochastic
control theory, and gives rise to a diffusive ÔHamilton-Jacobi-
BellmanÕ equation [29b,c, 30,30b]. However, the word ÔutilityÕ cannot
be found in many other interesting and useful books on finance [28,
37, 38, 39].
6. Black-Scholes Option pricing
Black and Scholes give two easy derivations of the B-S option
pricing equation (for those who are bored by easy to follow
derivations, see Merton [30]). The second derivation is the most
enlightening: the B-S equation is a straightforward application of
the CAPM.
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An option to buy an asset is the right to buy the asset at a specified
price P within a specified time horizon T (the option expires at time T
if not exercised). A ÔEuropeanÕ call option can only be exercised at
time T and will be exercised only if p - P ‡  0, where all financial
friction (brokerage costs) are ignored in this discussion. For 0 £  t < T
the option price w(p,t) obeys P £  w £  p. The question is: for 0 £  t < T
how should the option be priced? The future condition at t = T holds,
  w(p,T) = {p – P if p ≥ P, 0 if p < P .      (33)
The idea is to apply the CAPM to two assets, a stock S and itÕs option
Os. Following Black and Scholes [36], note first that since for small
price changes  
  ∆w = ∂w∂x ∆x .       (34)
This yields
  ∆w
w =
∆p
p (
p
w
∂w
∂x )         (35)
so that
  βw = pw ∂w∂x βp .          (36)
Let
  ∆R = Re – ro              (37)
denote the difference between the expected return on the efficient
portfolio (which we can take to be the market itself, or an index fund)
and the interest rate on risk-free assets. b D R is the risk premium.
In the CAPM we have the expected returns for the stock and option
are given by
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  ∆p
p = Rp∆t = ro∆t + ∆Rβp∆t
∆w
w = Rw∆t = ro∆t + ∆Rβw∆t.        (38)
According to Ito calculus [37], and because
  ∆p2 = σp2∆t ,                      (39)
for short space-time intervals we have
  
∆w = w(p + ∆p, t + ∆t) – w(p,t) = ∂w∂p ∆p +
∂w
∂t ∆t + p
2σp
∂2w
∂p2 ∆t .  (40)
Taking the expectation value of this equation divided by w and
combining with (38) yields the B-S equation
  ∂w
∂t = row – rop
∂w
∂p –
1
2p
2σp
∂2w
∂p2.     (41)
This is a backward-time diffusion equation. The final price w(P,T)
and expiration date T are  fixed, so the equation must be solved by
backward integration in t to find the solution (forward time solutions
do not exist). This derivation is not exhibited in popular texts [37,38]
but is very enlightening because it shows that the limitations on the
CAPM and B-S options pricing are the same. Both can, at best, be
used over short enough time intervals D t that there are no drastic
changes (surprises) in expected returns and variances due to shifts in
agentsÕ expectations in the market. The models canÕt be extended to
long times without empirically revising the estimates for gain and
variance as surprises occur.
Like the CAPM, the predictions of the B-S model are wrong: out of
the money options are systematically priced too low by the model,
and in the money options are priced too high. The fault lies with the
lognormal assumption: the lognormal distribution is too fat near the
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peak and too small in the wings to fit stock prices accurately. Traders
claim [31b] that the model does not work at all for stocks (individual
stock price distributions are themselves too noisy) but works for
bonds and foreign exchange if ÔsmileÕ is introduced. ÔSmileÕ is the
assumption that s  varies with t, which violates the model. ÔSmileÕ is
the engineersÕ way of fudging the parameters to make the
predictions of the model ÔworkÕ. An improvement was discovered by
D. Duck [31], who found that the exponential distribution
  
p(x) = Ae
γ(x – δ)
, x < δ
Ae–ν(x – δ) x ≥ δ  (41b)
holds for all price ranges in x(t, D t) of the log of price increments for
bonds and foreign exchange (individual stock distributions were too
noisy to draw conclusions). An option pricing model for the
exponential distribution is derived in [31]. For other attempts to go
beyond Black-Scholes see nearly any recent issue of the International
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance. A Hurst exponent,
consistent with D x as a Levy flight, has been extracted from market
index [31d,e] and foreign exchange [31f] data. The exponential
distribution can be distinguished from a Levy distribution if the price
information is accurate enough that terms O(logx) can be detected in
data anaylsis.
Options pricing with absorbing boundaries was solved for the
exponential distribution by Stein [31c].
7. Deterministic chaos vs. random noise at short times
The main point built into a Wiener process is that at the shortest
times stock prices are completely unpredictable: the price is
everywhere continuous but has no derivative. This is consistent with
short time unpredictability of real prices, which change in discrete
units over very short discrete time intervals.
A flow in phase space has a completely opposite short time behavior.
Chaotic and complex dynamical systems found in nature are not
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predictable at long times (mathematical models are still represented
by computable dynamics so long as all parameters used in the model
are computable), but at short times the flow is trivial: any flow can
always be parallelized (ÔrectifiedÕ) over a short enough finite time
interval. Over a short enough time interval there is always a
coordinate system (reachable via a differentiable transformation)
where the motion is free particle motion [11] (local integrability).
Chaotic systems are pseudo-random over long time intervals but are
models of perfect predictability over the shortest time intervals. One
can never ÔderiveÕ (23) from a phase  flow like (8), although it is
possible to use a system that is chaotic to generate discrete pseudo-
random time series at long times. However, short-time integrability
of phase flows like (8) and (19) is violated in the worst possible way
by stochastic dynamical models. I have argued elsewhere that
driven-dissipative chaotic deterministic dynamics generally cannot
be replaced by stochastic dynamics [5].
Another way to emphasize the incompatibility of the deterministic
and random models is to note that diffusion equations generate no
characteristic curves [18]. The characteristic curves are the particle
picture (for the same reason there is no particle, or wave, description
of the Schrdinger equation in quantum mechanics). First order
partial differential equations, linear and nonlinear, are equivalent to
particle systems but the only second order differential equation that
generates characteristic curves is the wave equation [18].
Generally speaking, in finance theory one could forget the entire
elaborate framework of GET except that books by theorists like
Merton still attempt to Ôsave the appearanceÕ by trying to use the
elaborate language of GET to describe far from equilibrium
phenomena (ÔepicyclesÕ by as new name). Black, on the other hand,
advised experimentation and did not expect econometrics to survive
in itÕs neo-classical form [35].
8. Nonequilibrium and instability in stochastic dynamics
According to economists predictions based on (24) are called
ÔequilibriumÕ even when the average excess demand does not vanish
(R = 0 is not guaranteed and is even undesirable from an investorÕs
standpoint). Even worse, they speak of Ômarket forcesÕ that return
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the prices Ôto valueÕ (meaning, presumably, ÔequilibriumÕ) in spite of
the fact that the drunken sailor described by (24) feels no restoring
force whatsoever and may even wander far from equilibrium. A
restoring force could only be introduced by letting the average drift R
depend on price, by making a price potential well, e.g. Financial
markets are instead modeled by a collection of n drunken sailors
(assets) with constant average drifts R. The job of the Fed Chairman
is to try to use words to restrain the collective drift of the drunken
sailors, and also via interest rates and the money supply.
Let me describe the ÔequilibriumÕ assumed to exist by the economist.
The usual argument says to subtract out the systematic return R and
study the fluctuations about that ÔequilibriumÕ, which is supposed to
be described by a rescaled price
 p = pe–Rt (41)
that should satisfy
 dp
dt = 0 . (41b)
in some sense. Such rescaling cannot be performed for an individual
stock  because for stocks R is unknown and is not even well-defined.
The standard argument is that we can do this rescaling for bonds and
foreign exchange, for the market as a whole, or for an index fund. I
will now show that rescaling does not lead to the idea of equilibrium
even for a low-risk asset, one where r is deterministic. Take the
simplest case of a constant interest rate r over some time horizon t,
for a treasury bond, e.g.,
  ∆p
p = r∆t + σ∆B(t) .    (42)
Stochastic integration then yields
  p(t) = poe(r – σ2/2)teσB(t),     (43)
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so that we can rescale the price by the deterministic/systematic part
to obtain
  p(t) = p(t)e–(r – σ2/2)t = poeσB(t) .  (43b)
We can study stability by calculating the moments of the Gaussian
distribution P(D B), and obtain
  p(t)k = = pko ekσ∆B(t) = pko ek
2σ2t/2 .   (44)
Clearly, this is not an ÔequilibriumÕ distribution because, even if one
chose a different scaling factor, e.g., in order to make the second
moment stable, then the rescaled higher moments will all still
diverge as t increases. The idea of defining statistical equilibrium by
rescaling prices is not possible. Another way to see that we are not in
equilibrium is to calculate the entropy of either the lognormal or
exponential distribution and observe that the entropy of the
distribution
 S(t) = – p(x,t) log p(x,t) dx
    (45)
 increases with time. An equilibrium distribution would maximize the
entropy subject to some constraint, which would allow the analog of
the inverse temperature to be introduced to describe hypothetical
Ôreversible tradingÕ due to the prevalence of lots of noise with low
financial friction. If price potential wells are not introduced then
drunken sailors can maximize the entropy and achieve equilibrium
only if we introduce walls (upper and lower bounds on prices) to
confine the sailors. Maybe feedback could stabilize the random
walkers, but there is so far no evidence for this in the data.
The origin of the economistsÕ misconception of stochastic dynamics
as market Ôequilibrium dynamicsÕ follows from the misconception
that maximizing the expected utility yields equilibrium. It doesnÕt,
whereas maximizing the entropy would.
The idea that the bond and foreign exchange markets obey the
exponential distribution seems at odds with the idea that markets
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are complex. In a complex system the distribution cannot be known
in advance [13]. One can only watch to see how events unfold and
then record them, but this unfolding gives no information about
future surprises. Complexity could only arise in a market obeying
exponential statistics via ÔsurprisesÕ, like changes in agentsÕ
expectations, that would violate the exponential distribution. That
is, if agents should become aware that they are creating an
exponential distribution and then try to exploit that information, our
expectation is that the distribution of price changes x will change.
To the extent that prices are exponential, not lognormal, standard
stochastic optimization theory will not work. A second order
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman diffusion equation cannot be derived to
describe the dynamics.
 Notice also that for finite and large D t we have on the basis of (42)
that
  p(t + ∆t) – p(t)
p(t) = e
R∆t
– 1
   (45)
  
so that the CAPM prediction would hold only for Rd D t << 1 even if
the lognormal model were correct. An improved CAPM based on the
exponential distribution will be presented later.
A positive expected gain R can be a destabilizing factor that may
actually produce increasing prices if agents act on the same
expectations. According to the empirical data there are no internal
Ôrestoring forcesÕ that can stabilize a free market (the Fed Chairman
implicitly acts on this assumption by trying to Ôtalk downÕ the
speculative bubble of 1995-Õ99)). Adam SmithÕs hand simply does not
exist in this picture, where the balancing of supply with demand
occurs randomly, infrequently, and only by accident. As Lewis points
out [22], a brokerage house is a Ôfull-service casino. Unlike Las Vegas
and Monte Carlo, they will not only accept your bets but will even
lend you the money to bet with (margin trading)! Margin is a
dangerous form of credit, so beware the gamblersÕ ruin (for an
example of the gamblersÕ ruin, see the history of LTCM [32b]).
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Merton stresses, in writing down (24), that he assumes that all
agents/investors have the same expectations about the dynamics of
the market. Bubbles and crashes are caused by uniform expectations
of many agents (with adequate capital) acting relatively coherently.
Restrictions that make capital more expensive for speculation
discourage expectations, causing bubbles to deflate. This is the hope
of the Federal Reserve Chairman late in 1999. This is all in keeping
with the idea that social behavior is not like natural law [5], but is
actually created to some extent by expectations. Krugman [26] sees
runs on a currency as an example of self-fulfilling expectations.
9. Econo-logic vs empirical data
Is econometrics scientific? Since Galileo, the abstraction that
constitutes a science must be empirically based. Forgetting for the
moment about dynamics, can the idea of a utility function with (2) be
used to predict or even describe demand, supply, and prices in real
markets, or in somewhat realistic toy models of markets when we
look at empirical data? Osborne [21] asked whether there is evidence
that supply-demand curves pass this basic test. The evidence for
econometrics, if it exists, does not appear in SamuelsonÕs text. The
supply-demand ÔgraphsÕ in Samuelson are just ÔcartoonsÕ that are
not based upon any known empirical data. Economists like to discuss
elasticity (requiring a continuously differentiable utility) but do not
show that utility can be measured and do not estimate it or it's slopes
(marginal utilities) from real data. There is, as Osborne pointed out,
a very good reason for this. Given a hypothesized abstract utility
(purely theoretical, not empirical), one could then use (2) to derive
the predicted price vector p for n commodities as a function of
demand or supply x, p = f(x,l ). Osborne points out that this relation
cannot be extracted from real data, and observes that there is no
unique price as a function of demand or supply (calling into question
(2) as the basis for anything). Example: given twenty tomatoes
(supply), all other things being equal, then what's the price? Answer:
anything or nothing. Question, given demand for 50 Ford
Mondeos/Contours, what's the price? Answer: not able to decide it
empirically (nearly twice the price in Germany as in America, in fact,
but arbitrage is not attractive due to taxes and shipping prices, i.e.,
due to Ôfinancial frictionÕ). This is bad news for econometrics: it
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implies that the idea of path-independent utility makes no sense
empirically (writing down utility as a functional may make sense
whenever there is something to optimize, and when we know the
dynamics in advance). Osborne illustrates that demand and supply as
a function of price do seem to make sense empirically and gives as
examples shopping for dresses and filling market limit orders. Black
[22] later pointed out that discrete data on demand as a function of
price are extremely noisy, so that in practice the required curves canÕt
be constructed from known empirical data.
Econometricians sometimes admit that their field is more like logic
and pure mathematics than it is like an empirical science like physics
[14,23]. Econometrics has a history of contributions by pure
mathematicians, with very little input by physicists. Theoretical
finance, through Osborne, Mandelbrot, Black, and Duck (not to
ignore Stein) has developed from very different initial conditions,
has developed more as an attempt to be an empirical science
although the language of GET still permeates too much of
theoretical finance. Can central bankers and corporations
successfully turn Moscow into Wall Street and Chihuahua into Wal
Mart? The ABH model and control theory provide no theoretical
foundation for this belief. Globalization, the capitalization of
everything everywhere, is a very large uncontrolled experiment
where no one knows the outcome. Events like the collapse of the
USSR, the financial crises in Mexico and the Far East, the financial
crisis in Brazil, and the collapse of Long Time Capital Management
(LTCM) are examples of ÔsurprisesÕ that were not predicted by any
theory and which were not anticipated by many very astute financial
agents. The fact that markets operate on the basis of noise and
complexity rather than on the basis of Adam SmithÕs
controlling/stabilizing hand means that anything can happen,
including long runs of either pleasant or unpleasant events. For an
interesting history of the evolution of the idea of Adam SmithÕs hand,
see [40].
Black [35] points out that econometric theorizing is not accepted on
the basis of experiment, but because researchers persuade one
another that the theory is Ôcorrect and relevantÕ. This, alone, is not
enough to establish a theory in physics where precise identical
repeated, experiments are performed (or in astronomy where there
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are no controlled experiments but careful observation provides
accurate data), although string theory and various too-ambitious
models in cosmology are open to criticism on this count. Black
expected that experiments eventually will be done in economics and
finance whenever the desire is great enough. LTCM was a
completely uncontrolled experiment. LTCM went under because the
usual expectations about arbitrage proved wrong: bond interest
spreads widened instead of Ôreturning to equilibrium.Õ
A former dynamical systems theorist who worked in econometrics
[15] argues that econometrics is socially-constructed and notes that
the notion of market equilibrium was philosophically soothing in a
time when conservatives and others were afraid of revolt and
revolution by the masses. General Equilibrium Theory is more like a
mathematics-based ideology than like a science. In the age of
complexity it will not likely survive whereas Newtonian mechanics
not only survived but generated the field of deterministic chaos, and
has been speculated to contain complexity as well [13]. The recent
deregulation of banking/insurance/brokerage combined with the
lack of regulation of options trading will surely lead to ÔsurprisesÕ!
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